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We run several differences-in-differences specifications to estimate the treatment effect of 
M&A deals on health plan characteristics. The first set of specifications considers the effect 
of mergers on the monthly premium (plan price). Then, these specifications are re-estimated 
for the plan quality characteristics.
IMPACT OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS ON 
PLAN PREMIUMS & DRUG FORMULARIES 
IN MEDICARE PART D
Anna Chorniy, Daniel P. Miller and Tilan Tang
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY
In this paper, we examine the impact of hori-
zontal mergers amongst insurers on competi-
tion in the Medicare Part D prescription drug 
market. Theory predictions about the effect of 
mergers on price and product quality are con-
founded by three competing forces: increased 
cost efficiency, market power, and bargaining 
power with upstream suppliers. Using panel 
data for the full set of plans offered by Part D 
insurers between 2006-2012, we use a differ-
ences-in-differences identification strategy to 
document the effect that merger activity has on 
plan pricing and drug coverage characteristics.  
We find that plans affected by a merger experi-
ence higher premiums as a result of increased 
market power. However, for merging insurers 
that restructure their plan offerings, price falls 
to offset the market power effect. The results on 
drug formulary measures show that merging 
on its own has no effect on the generosity of 
drug coverage. Yet for restructured plans, there 
are sizable merger effects on coverage in the 
form of reduced copay/coinsurance rates and 
increased 
















pliers are a 
major source of gains stemming from mergers.
ABSTRACT MOTIVATION
Part D is a recently created program that established a 
regulated and subsidized insurance exchange for se-
nior citizens to purchase prescription drug coverage 
from competing private insurers. The program lifetime 
overlapped with a dozen large scale horizontal M&A 
deals involving the parent companies of insurers of-
fering Part D plans. Each year, an average of 16% of all 
insurance plans are directly affected by an M&A deal.
Theoretical effect of mergers is ambigous. There are 
three competing forces involved: 
1. Increased productive efficiency or enhanced qual-
ity of product offerings (+)
2. Increased monopsony or bargaining power over 
suppliers (+)
3. Reduced competition that leads to higher prices 
for customers and/or lower product quality if firms 
compete on quality dimensions (-)
We overcome one of the main drawbacks experienced 
by the earlier research by obtaining a highly detailed 
data set.
Medicare Part D is a program that expands ex-
isting health insurance coverage for the elderly.  
It adds prescription drug coverage to Medicare. 
 
It was authorized under the 2003 “Medicare Pre-
scription Drug, Improvement, and Moderniza-
tion” Act and enacted in 2006.
As of January 1st, 2006 22.5mln of 43mln eli-
gible individuals signed up. Enrollment is volun-
tary*.
Estimated 10-year program cost between
2009-2018 is $727.3bn (Medicare Trustees Re-
port).  
 
Part D is subsidized by the government but the 
benefit is offered by private insurers who may 
freely enter and exit the market, choose the 
number of plans to offer, and set monthly pre-
miums. They are also largely responsible for the 
benefit design: the number and type of drugs to 
cover and the conditions of such coverage. 
 
The regulations establish a number of coverage 
standards. All providers are required to offer at 
least one basic plan that meets (or is actuarially 
equivalent to) a minimum coverage level with 
respect to the deductible, coinsurance and co-
payment rates, and the scope of drugs covered 
on the formulary. In addition to a basic plan, the 
companies may offer enhanced plans that have 
more generous coverage through a combina-
tion of lower deductibles, lower copay/coinsur-
ance rates, and drug coverage for a larger set of 
medical condition. 
 





We utilize detailed longitudinal data on plans that in-
cludes an average of 1,500 stand-alone, Part D plans 
(PDPs) per year. The data span 7 years from 2006 when 
Medicare Part D was introduced to the most recently 
available data in 2012 and covers all 39 geographical 
markets. 
During the sample period the premium increased by 
43% and the average plan market share went up by ap-
proximately the same amount. Another way to look at 
it, average plan enrollment of all and in particular sub-
sidized beneficiaries increased. The number of plans 
offered in each region plummeted. The program enroll-
ment grew by 16% over 7 years. 
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We report four main sets of results on the effects of mergers: 
•	 I. Price effects (on plan premiums)
•	 II. Quality effects 
1. number of top100 drugs covered
2. total number of drugs covered







We collected data on M&A activity from the Securities 
Data Company merger and acquisition module which 
contains detailed information on all deals involving pub-
lic and private companies.  
 
In the time frame suitable for our analysis, from 2006 to 
2011 we identified a total of 11 completed horizontal 
M&A deals amongst companies that offer Medicare Part 
D policies. 
 
 We restrict attention to horizontal mergers and acquisi-
tions of assets where either participants or their imme-
diate subsidiary offered a PDP at least in the year prior 
to the merger completion date. We exclude all the deals 











pharmacy management) and vertical mergers with phar-
macies.
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